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A Critical Analysis of  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada decided Edmonton Journal v. 
Alberta (Attorney General),1 in which it constitutionalized the open court 
principle under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.2 This decision was groundbreaking, however, not because of 
the constitutional holding it reached, but because of the path it took to get 
there.  
While it has since been inextricably woven into the fabric of section 
2(b), the constitutionality of the open court principle is not immediately 
apparent from the text of that provision, which guarantees the “freedom 
of thought, belief, opinion and expression” and “freedom of the press”. 
Rather, the Court in Edmonton Journal premised the incorporation of the 
open court principle into section 2(b) on three fundamental propositions, 
which collectively bridge the gap between text and principle: 
(1) The courts play an important role in our democratic society and, 
therefore, it is important for the public to be informed about the courts; 
                                                                                                             
∗  Partner, Ruby Shiller Chan. I would like to thank Professors Jamie Cameron and Nathalie 
Des Rosiers for their very helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. They are not responsible 
for my failure to heed all of their advice. 
1  [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”]. 
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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(2) Freedom of expression protects listeners (i.e., the right to receive 
information and opinions) as well as speakers (i.e., the right to dis-
seminate information and opinions); and 
(3) It is only through the press that most individuals can really learn of 
what is transpiring in the courts. 
Taken together, these three propositions suggest a broad vision of 
section 2(b) of the Charter that protects not only the simple act of 
expression, but also the acts necessary to make that expression meaning-
ful (e.g., access to information, reliance on the ability of the press to 
gather information, etc.).  
More significantly, while they were developed by the Court in order 
to explain why section 2(b) encompasses the open court principle, these 
propositions are not inherently limited to the courts. The judiciary is not 
the only branch of government that plays an important role in our 
democratic society and about which it is important for the public to be 
informed — the same can be said of provincial legislatures and Parlia-
ment, as well as of the executive. Nor do members of the public have any 
greater ability to access such institutions than they do the courts. Thus, 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Edmonton Journal suggested a 
muscular conception of section 2(b) and evoked an image of the constitu-
tional right as the primary guarantor of transparency in our democracy. 
The question was whether the Supreme Court would follow through on 
this course and extend the growth of section 2(b) to its natural limits, or 
search for other ways of limiting the broad conception of section 2(b) to 
the specific context in which it arose. 
Fifteen years later, we have our answer thanks to three judgments 
released by the Court in its 2010-2011 term: Ontario (Public Safety and 
Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.,3 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Canada (Attorney General)4 and R. v. National Post.5 These judgments 
collectively reveal that the robust vision of section 2(b) for which the 
foundation was laid in Edmonton Journal would ultimately be confined 
to the four walls of the courthouse. Within the courthouse, the Supreme 
Court re-affirmed and perhaps even extended the presumption of open-
ness and the related right of the press to gather news under section 2(b) 
                                                                                                             
3  [2010] S.C.J. No. 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers’ 
Assn.”]. 
4  [2011] S.C.J. No. 2, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.)”].  
5  [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Post”]. 
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of the Charter in C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.). Outside of the courthouse, 
however, the Court put the brakes on. In Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., the 
Court held that the presumption of openness afforded to the courts does 
not apply to other public institutions. And in National Post, the Court 
held that section 2(b) does not provide a general protection for all 
methods of newsgathering or even a method as tested as that of relying 
on confidential sources.  
The courthouse is, of course, familiar territory. Judges go to work in 
courthouses every day and are well aware of the effects of publicity on 
their operational efficacy. Judges are also keenly appreciative of the 
critical link between the openness of courts and their own legitimacy as 
unelected decision-makers. This awareness expresses itself every time a 
judge cites the well-worn aphorism that justice must not only be done, 
but must also be seen to be done. Thus, it did not require a great leap of 
imagination for the Supreme Court of Canada to expand the scope of 
section 2(b) to encompass the openness of courts. The true test of the 
Court’s boldness came when it was presented with the opportunity to 
extend the same guarantee of transparency to other public institutions. 
When that time came, the Court balked. Once the principles underlying 
the expansion of section 2(b) became unhinged from the safe, traditional 
context in which they were born, they proved to be too overwhelming for 
today’s cautious Court to fully embrace.  
This paper reviews the Supreme Court of Canada’s section 2(b) 
analyses in each of Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.), 
and National Post against the backdrop of the robust vision of section 
2(b) that once seemed within reach. This paper concludes by observing 
that the constraints placed by the Court on access to information and 
newsgathering in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. and National Post, respec-
tively, have severely restricted the ability of section 2(b) to achieve 
openness in any area other than the courthouse. The notion of transparent 
government, which once seemed to be on the horizon as section 2(b)’s 
chief concern, has been reduced to just one factor among many in the 
section 2(b) calculus. 
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II. PROPOSITIONS UNDERLYING THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION  
OF THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE  
The open court principle pre-dates the Charter. As the Supreme Court 
of Canada has repeatedly observed, the open court principle has “long 
been recognized as a cornerstone of the common law”6 and can be traced 
in the common law as far back as the House of Lords decision in 1913 in 
Scott v. Scott.7 To go back even further, one of the most oft-cited pas-
sages in support of the open court principle is that of the 18th-century 
philosopher, Jeremy Bentham: 
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape have 
full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the 
checks applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no 
publicity there is no justice. … Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is 
the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against 
improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.8 
The Supreme Court of Canada has expanded upon Bentham’s senti-
ments, albeit in less dramatic fashion, in a number of seminal decisions.9 
Most notably, Wilson J. articulated five distinct benefits that flow from 
the requirement that the courts operate in full view of the public in her 
concurring opinion in Edmonton Journal: (i) it maintains an effective 
evidentiary process (i.e., the open examination of witnesses in the 
presence of the public is more conducive to the search for truth); (ii) it 
ensures a judiciary and juries that behave fairly and that are sensitive to 
the values espoused by society; (iii) it ensures that justice is not only 
done, but is seen to be done so as to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice; (iv) it provides an ongoing opportunity for the 
community to learn how the justice system operates and how the law 
                                                                                                             
6  Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) [here-
inafter “Vancouver Sun”]; Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] S.C.J. No. 43, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 
253, at para. 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Named Person”]. 
7  [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L.). 
8  Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, [1982] S.C.J. No. 1, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 
at 183 (S.C.C.); Canadian Broadcasting Co. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) (Re R. v. 
Carson), [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C.B.C. (Re R. 
v. Carson”]; C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.), supra, note 4, at para. 28; Named Person, supra, note 6, at 
para. 31. See Burger C.J.’s plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 
(1980) [hereinafter “Richmond Newspapers”], for an especially detailed summary of the historical 
origins of the open court principle.  
9  Named Person, supra, note 6, at para. 32; Vancouver Sun, supra, note 6, at para. 25; 
Edmonton Journal, supra, note 1, at para. 3, per Cory J., and paras. 61-62, per Wilson J. 
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applies daily (i.e., it has an educational function); and (v) it provides 
litigants the satisfaction of having their interests vindicated by a public 
airing of the injustices they feel they have suffered.10 
With the advent of the Charter, the open court principle acquired ad-
ditional significance. In a series of cases beginning with Edmonton 
Journal, the Supreme Court of Canada constitutionalized the open court 
principle. Interestingly, the Court did not opt for the narrower approach 
of doing so under the rubric of the principles of fundamental justice in 
section 7 of the Charter, which would have restricted the operation of the 
principle to instances in which a person’s life, liberty or security of the 
person was at stake. One might have expected the Court to have pursued 
this route given that the various rationales that had been advanced for the 
open court principle appear, at first blush, to have more to do with the 
proper administration of justice than with freedom of expression.11 
Indeed, the pre-Charter case law on the open court principle is perhaps 
most notable for the absence of discussion of freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press as underlying values for the openness of courts.12 
The Supreme Court did not, however, adopt a narrow approach. In-
stead, the Court followed the lead set by its American counterpart in 
Richmond Newspapers and made the open court principle part and parcel 
of the freedoms of expression and the press guaranteed by section 2(b) of 
the Charter.13 For many, this was a welcome acknowledgment of the 
reality that the free expression rationale underlies all of the other ration-
ales for openness. As M. David Lepofsky wrote in his book, Open 
Justice: The Constitutional Right to Attend and Speak About Criminal 
Proceedings: 
If the openness of criminal proceedings ensures judicial honesty and 
fair treatment for accuseds, this is so only because the public can freely 
discuss what transpires in the courtroom. Similarly, public confidence 
                                                                                                             
10  Edmonton Journal, supra, note 1, at paras. 61-62, per Wilson J.  
11  Id., at para. 4, per Cory J., and paras. 61-62, per Wilson J.  
12  M. David Lepofsky, Open Justice: The Constitutional Right to Attend and Speak About 
Criminal Proceedings (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985), at 48 [hereinafter “Lepofsky”]. 
13  In Richmond Newspapers, supra, note 8, Burger C.J. authored a plurality opinion holding 
that the right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials is constitutionally guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. Justices Stevens, White, Brennan, Stewart and Blackmun each filed concurring 
opinions. Only Rehnquist J. dissented. For explicit statements linking the open court principle to  
s. 2(b) of the Charter, see Vancouver Sun, supra, note 6, at para. 26; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. 
Ontario, [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188, at para. 29 (S.C.C.); and Named Person, supra, 
note 6, at para. 33. 
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in the administration of justice cannot be promoted by the requirement 
of openness unless the events occurring in the courtroom can form the 
basis of unfettered public dialogue and debate.14  
Thus, where parties have sought to rely on statutes placing limita-
tions on the openness of courts, the Supreme Court has held that such 
limitations infringe section 2(b) and required them to be justified under 
section 1 of the Charter.15 Similarly, where parties have had resort to a 
statutory or common law rule that confers discretion on the courts to 
limit openness, the Court has held that such discretion must be exercised 
in accordance with what has now come to be known as the Dagen-
ais/Mentuck test, which was designed to mirror the justificatory Oakes 
analysis.16 This approach has been applied to publication bans,17 sealing 
orders18 and orders to close the courtroom.19 It has been applied to both 
trial and pre-trial proceedings, and to both the proceedings themselves 
and any documents or records filed in such proceedings.20 It has even 
been applied to proceedings in civil, and not only criminal, litigation.21 
                                                                                                             
14  Lepofsky, supra, note 12, at 48-49. 
15  In Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] S.C.J. No. 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 
(S.C.C.), the Supreme Court upheld the mandatory publication ban for bail hearings provided by  
s. 517(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, after conducting a formal s. 1 Oakes [R. v. Oakes, 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”] analysis. Similarly, in 
Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 67, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 
(S.C.C.), the Court upheld the mandatory publication ban for the identity of a sexual assault complai-
nant provided by s. 442(3) of the Criminal Code after finding the provision justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter. In contrast, the Court struck down s. 30 of the Judicature Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. J-1, in Edmonton 
Journal, supra, note 1, which imposed a mandatory publication ban on certain details related to 
matrimonial proceedings after finding that the ban could not be justified under the Oakes test. 
16  Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 
at 878 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”]; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 
at para. 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”]; Oakes, id.. The test requires that the party seeking an 
order to limit the openness of the courts satisfy two steps: (i) such an order is necessary in order to 
prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures 
will not prevent the risk; and (ii) the salutary effects of the order outweigh the deleterious effects on 
the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free 
expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of 
justice. 
17  Dagenais, id.; Mentuck, id. 
18  Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, supra, note 13. 
19  C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson), supra, note 8. 
20  See Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, supra, note 8 and Toronto Star News-
papers Ltd. v. Ontario, supra, note 13, for the application of the open court principle to documents 
and records filed in pre-trial proceedings. 
21  Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.). 
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All of these cases have been subject to a presumption of openness 
applied under section 2(b) of the Charter. 
While it has become a “fixed star in our constitutional constellation” 
(to borrow a phrase from Jackson J.),22 the notion that s. 2(b) of the 
Charter requires the courts and their processes to be presumptively open 
is not immediately apparent from the text of the provision. Section 2(b) 
provides that: “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: … (b) 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of 
the press and other media of communication.” A strict reading of the text 
might suggest, for instance, that section 2(b) would be infringed by a 
publication ban, but not by an order excluding the public from the 
courtroom. The former proscribes an act of expression, whereas the latter 
proscribes the act of accessing the information upon which the expres-
sion is based. While the latter may be thought of as a necessary precondi-
tion to ensuring that the former is meaningful, it finds no direct textual 
anchor in section 2(b). This begs the question of how the open court 
principle became incorporated into freedom of expression. 
The Court first dipped its toes in these doctrinal waters in Edmonton 
Journal. At issue in that case was a statutory provision that prescribed a 
mandatory publication ban on details related to matrimonial proceed-
ings.23 Thus, it was not strictly necessary for the Court to rely on an 
expansive view of section 2(b) in order to find an infringement of 
freedom of expression. The Court could have simply rooted the violation 
in the fact that individuals — particularly, members of the press — were 
prohibited from expressing themselves through the medium of publica-
tion. But the Court went beyond that. In a majority opinion written by 
Cory J., the Court was driven to the section 2(b) violation by the cumula-
tive force of three propositions: 
(1) The courts play an important role in a democratic society and, 
therefore, it is important for the public to be informed about the 
courts;24 
                                                                                                             
22  In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, at 642 (1942), 
Jackson J. famously wrote: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” 
23  Edmonton Journal, supra, note 1, at para. 2. 
24  Id., at para. 5; C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson), supra, note 8, at para. 20.  
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(2) Freedom of expression protects listeners (i.e., the right to receive 
information and opinions) as well as speakers (i.e., the right to dis-
seminate information and opinions);25 
(3) It is only through the press that most individuals can really learn of 
what is transpiring in the courts.26 
These propositions were innovative not only for their incorporation 
of the open court principle into section 2(b) of the Charter, but also for 
what they said about section 2(b) in general. Adopting the purposive 
approach to constitutional interpretation espoused by Dickson C.J.C. in 
Hunter v. Southam Inc.,27 Cory J. suggested a muscular conception of 
section 2(b) as a guarantee of the freedom to engage not only in acts of 
expression, but also in acts necessary to make expression meaningful, such 
as accessing information about public institutions and relying on the press’ 
ability to gather information about such institutions. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court observed in the parallel case of Richmond Newspapers (which Cory 
J. cited), the right of the public and the press to attend a trial and to 
communicate their observations concerning that trial can be described as 
both a “right of access” and a “right to gather information”.28  
The Supreme Court of Canada developed these principles further in 
the subsequent case of C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson). In that case, the decision 
under appeal was an order restricting public access to the courtroom.29 
Thus, unlike in Edmonton Journal, the question of whether section 2(b) 
protects more than mere acts of expression was directly engaged. In a 
unanimous opinion authored by La Forest J., the Court reinforced the 
reasoning in Edmonton Journal. Justice La Forest repeatedly emphasized 
that expression can only be meaningful if informed, and information can 
only be acquired through access. While “the freedom to express ideas 
and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit 
of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b)”, La Forest J. wrote, “so too is the 
right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in 
the first place”.30 This right of the public to information about the courts, 
in turn, “depend[s] on the freedom of the press to transmit this informa-
                                                                                                             
25  Edmonton Journal, id., at para. 10; Ford. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. 
No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at 767 (S.C.C.); C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson), id., at para. 23. 
26  Edmonton Journal, id., at para. 10. 
27  [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.). 
28  Richmond Newspapers, supra, note 8, at 576. 
29  C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson), supra, note 8, at para. 2. 
30  Id., at para. 23. 
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tion”.31 The freedom of the press “not only encompasse[s] the right to 
transmit news and other information, but also the right to gather this 
information”.32 
The last sentence in the above paragraph is particularly interesting 
because it incorporates a view of the law that La Forest J. first expressed 
in his sole concurring opinion in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Lessard33 — namely, that section 2(b) protects the general freedom of the 
press to “gather news”, 34 which is ostensibly broader than the freedom to 
access public institutions and their documents. The latter is merely one 
means of achieving the former. In C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson), a unanimous 
Supreme Court signed on to the view that section 2(b) encompasses both. 
However, just as La Forest J. appeared to broaden section 2(b), he 
also circumscribed its scope by adding an important caveat. Justice La 
Forest emphasized that he was not holding that section 2(b) provided for 
the right of public access to all public institutions or even the right of 
access to all areas of the courthouse (e.g., jury rooms, judges’ chambers, 
conference rooms, etc.). Courtrooms are different, La Forest J. held, 
because they “have, since time immemorial, been public arenas”.35 What 
La Forest J. did not explain was why the traditional openness or lack 
thereof of the public institution to which access is sought should matter 
under section 2(b) — as opposed to section 1 — if the institution is 
nonetheless an important one in our democracy and information about 
that institution is therefore necessary in order to make freedom of 
expression meaningful.  
Justice La Forest’s simultaneous expansion and contraction of the 
Court’s previous opinion in Edmonton Journal raised several questions 
about the precise scope of section 2(b). Is there any right of access to 
information about public institutions other than the courts and, if so, how 
much? How broad is the right of access and the right to gather news 
outside of the courtroom but within the courthouse? And, finally, does 
the right to gather news encompass any and all means of gathering news 
or is it simply limited to the right of access?  
Fifteen years later, we have our answers. In the 2010-2011 term, the 
Supreme Court of Canada released three judgments that respectively 
                                                                                                             
31  Id. 
32  Id., at para. 24. 
33  [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lessard”]. 
34  Id., at para. 2, per La Forest J. 
35  C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson), supra, note 8, at para. 28. 
178 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
addressed each of these three questions: Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., C.B.C. 
v. Canada (A.G.) and National Post. The presumption of openness under 
section 2(b) applies not only within the courtroom, but to all public areas 
of the courthouse (e.g., hallways), the Court held. Access to information 
outside of the courthouse, however, is governed by substantially stricter 
standards. Claimants must show, among other things, that the informa-
tion sought is “necessary for meaningful public commentary” before they 
can even get their foot into the section 2(b) door. And the press cannot 
count on section 2(b) guaranteeing them the right to gather news by 
means other than the right of access (e.g., by relying on confidential 
sources free from state interference).  
Each of these three judgments is discussed in more detail below. 
III. CRIMINAL LAWYERS’ ASSN. — ACCESS TO  
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. arose from the murder of Domenic Racco 
and the trial of two accused for this murder: Graham Rodney Court and 
Peter Dennis Monaghan. The Crown alleged that Court and Monaghan 
were hired to kill Racco. Both were convicted after a jury trial in 1991, 
only to have the Court of Appeal order new trials for both on the basis of 
fresh evidence (in relation to Monaghan) and inadequate jury instructions 
(in relation to both Court and Monaghan).36  
At the new trial, the two men applied for and obtained a stay of pro-
ceedings on the ground that their Charter rights under sections 7, 11(b) 
and 11(d) had been violated. More specifically, the trial judge found 
numerous instances of abusive conduct by state officials, including 
“deliberate non-disclosure”, “deliberate editing of useful information”, a 
“negligent breach of the duty to maintain original evidence”, and 
“improper cross-examination and jury addresses” during the first trial. 
The trial judge’s vociferous rebuke of the state resulted in an investiga-
tion by the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) into the conduct of the 
local police forces and the Crown Attorney in the case. In a terse press 
release, the OPP exonerated the police on the grounds that there was “no 
evidence that the officers attempted to obstruct justice by destroying or 
withholding a vital piece of evidence” and “no evidence that information 
                                                                                                             
36  Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., supra, note 3, at paras. 8-9. 
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withheld from defence was done deliberately and with the intent to 
obstruct justice”. The OPP offered no explanation for its conclusions.37 
The stark gap between the findings of the trial judge on the stay ap-
plication and the OPP’s conclusions prompted the Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association to make a request under section 10 of the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act38 to the Minister of the 
Solicitor General and Correctional Services for disclosure of certain 
records relating to the OPP’s investigation — namely, a 318-page police 
report detailing the results of the OPP’s investigation; a memorandum 
from a Crown Attorney to the Regional Director of Crown Operations 
containing legal advice with respect to the police report; and a letter from 
the Regional Director of Crown Operations to a police official also 
containing legal advice on the OPP investigation. The Minister refused to 
disclose any of the requested records, claiming several exemptions under 
FIPPA including section 14 (law enforcement), section 19 (solicitor-
client privilege), section 20 (danger to health and safety) and section 21 
(personal privacy).39 
The Minister’s decision was reviewed by the Assistant Information 
and Privacy Commissioner (the “Commissioner”), at which stage the 
state withdrew its reliance on the exemption under section 20 (danger to 
health and safety). The Commissioner found that the public interest in 
disclosure “clearly outweigh[ed]” the purpose of the exemption in 
section 21 (personal privacy) and stated that he would, therefore, have 
applied the public interest override found in section 23 of FIPPA. 
However, the Commissioner nevertheless upheld the Minister’s refusal to 
disclose because he held that the other exemptions — namely, section 14 
(law enforcement) and section 19 (solicitor-client privilege) — are not 
subject to the public interest override in section 23 as a matter of statu-
tory construction. The Commissioner further concluded that the statutory 
scheme in FIPPA did not violate the Criminal Lawyers’ Association right 
to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.40 
The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner’s decision on appeal. 
On further appeal, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal split 2-1. The 
majority, in an opinion written by LaForme J.A., allowed the appeal and 
held that the exemption scheme in FIPPA infringed section 2(b) of the 
                                                                                                             
37  Id., at paras. 10-11. 
38  R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 (“FIPPA”).  
39  Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., supra, note 3, at paras. 12-13. 
40  Id., at para. 15. 
180 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Charter. Justice Juriansz dissented and questioned whether section 2(b) 
was even engaged.41 The stage was thus set for the Supreme Court of 
Canada to resolve the issue. 
In a unanimous opinion co-authored by McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella 
J., the Court restored the Commissioner’s decision confirming the 
constitutionality of the exemption scheme in FIPPA. The Court framed 
the primary question — and the only question in the case with which this 
paper is concerned — as whether section 2(b) of the Charter protects 
access to information and, if so, in what circumstances.42 In answering 
this question, the Court drew on the methodology that it had developed 
in its earlier decisions of Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General)43 
and Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc.44 for determining whether 
a particular expressive activity is protected by section 2(b). That method-
ology requires an examination of the following three questions: 
(1) Does the activity in question have expressive content, thereby 
bringing it within the reach of section 2(b)? 
(2) Is there something in the method or location of that expression that 
would remove that protection? With respect to location, the question 
is whether the place is a public place where one would expect con-
stitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression 
in that place does not conflict with the purposes which section 2(b) 
is intended to serve — namely, (a) democratic discourse; (b) truth 
finding; and (c) self-fulfilment. To answer this question, one is to 
consider the historical or actual function of the place as well as any 
other aspects of the place which suggest that expression within it 
would undermine the values underlying free expression.  
(3) If the activity is protected, does the state action infringe that 
protection, either in purpose or effect?45 
The Court held that these principles — developed in the context of 
section 2(b) claims based on expressive activities — apply equally to 
section 2(b) claims based on access to government information with two 
refinements. First, in order to show that there is expressive content in the 
                                                                                                             
41  Id., at para. 17. 
42  Id., at para. 30. 
43  [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 967-68 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]. 
44  [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Montréal 
(City)”]. 
45  Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., supra, note 3, at para. 32; Montréal (City), id., at paras. 56, 74. 
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act of accessing information, a Charter claimant must show that the 
denial of such access “effectively precludes meaningful commentary”. 
Second, while it is the method or location of the expression that can 
remove the protection of section 2(b) in an “expressive activities” case, it 
is the nature of the information sought (or the nature of the government 
institution about which information is sought) that can do the same in an 
“access to information” case.46 
On the specific facts of Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., the Court held that 
the Association had failed to demonstrate that a meaningful public 
discussion of the handling of the investigation into the Racco murder and 
the prosecution of Court and Monaghan could not take place under the 
statutory regime in FIPPA. The reasons for this conclusion were sparse. 
The Court simply noted that the record supporting the trial judge’s 
conclusions on the stay application about state misconduct was already in 
the public domain and stated in a conclusory manner that the Criminal 
Lawyers’ Association had not established that the additional disclosure of 
the police report was necessary for a meaningful public discussion on the 
subject.47  
In addition, the Court concluded that even if the Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association had been able to satisfy the “necessity for meaningful 
commentary” test, the nature of the documents covered by the section 14 
(law enforcement) and section 19 (solicitor-client privilege) exemptions 
would remove them from the protection of section 2(b) of the Charter. 
The production of the documents would “impinge on privileges” and 
“impair the proper functioning of relevant government institutions”.48 
The analysis never reached section 1. 
The purpose of this paper, of course, is not to engage in a detailed 
examination of the merits of the Court’s judgment. Rather, it is to 
examine the extent to which the Court’s judgment lived up to, expanded 
upon, or reined in the muscular conception of section 2(b) of the Charter 
that it hinted at in its earlier open court decisions of Edmonton Journal 
and C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson). In this regard, a few observations are in 
order. 
First, while the Court recognized a limited right of access to gov-
ernment information for the first time, the Court nevertheless affirmed La 
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Forest J.’s caveat in C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson) that access to the courts 
cannot be equated with access to other public institutions under section 
2(b). Moreover, the Court provided a principled basis for this distinction 
by adopting the methodology developed in Montréal (City). Just as the 
protection for expressive activities under section 2(b) depends on the 
method or location of those activities, the protection for access to 
information under section 2(b) depends on the nature of the government 
information sought (or the nature of the institution about which informa-
tion is sought). By way of illustration, the Court wrote: 
It may also be that a particular government function is incompatible with 
access to certain documents. For example, it might be argued that while 
the open court principle requires that court hearings and judgments be 
open and available for public scrutiny and comment, memos and notes 
leading to a judicial decision are not subject to public access. This would 
impair the proper functioning of the court by preventing full and frank 
deliberation and discussion at the pre-judgment stage. The principle of 
Cabinet confidence for internal government discussions offers another 
example. The historic function of a particular institution may assist in 
determining the bounds of institutional confidentiality, as discussed in 
Montréal (City), at para. 22. In that case, this Court acknowledged that 
certain government functions and activities require privacy (para. 76). 
This applies to demands for access to information in government hands. 
Certain types of documents may remain exempt from disclosure 
because disclosure would impact the proper functioning of affected 
institutions.49 
This methodology has been persuasively criticized for importing 
what are, in essence, section 1 justification concerns into the section 2(b) 
analysis and thereby creating constitutional “dead zones” in which no 
expression is allowed rather than allowing for a more fact-specific, 
contextual analysis.50 A similar critique could probably be levelled at the 
adaptation of this methodology to the access to government information 
context, although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.  
But leaving aside the wisdom of the criteria chosen by the Court, the 
incorporation of the Montréal (City) test into the “access to information” 
context at least has the virtue of providing a set of criteria upon which to 
                                                                                                             
49  Id., at para. 40. 
50  See Brian Slattery, “Freedom of Expression and Location: Are There Constitutional Dead 
Zones?” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 245 [hereinafter “Cameron & 
Ryder”]. 
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distinguish a claim for access to information about the courts from a 
claim for access to information about other government institutions. The 
courts have traditionally operated in the open and this openness does not 
impede their operational efficacy, nor is it incompatible with the values 
underlying section 2(b). Accordingly, access to the courts is granted more 
readily than it would be to other public institutions. The adoption of this 
distinguishing criteria provided a principled basis for La Forest J.’s 
caveat in C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson) and, thus, reinforced the one restric-
tive aspect of that judgment. 
The expansive portions of C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson) (and Edmonton 
Journal before it), meanwhile, were curtailed. While the Court recog-
nized a constitutional right of access to government information for the 
first time,51 the Court imposed a precondition to the exercise of this right 
that is inconsistent with its broad pronouncements on the scope of 
section 2(b) in its early open court cases — namely, the requirement that 
claimants in an “access to information” case show that the access sought 
is “necessary for the meaningful exercise of free expression on matters of 
public or political interest”. Ironically, the Court cited none other than La 
Forest J.’s opinion in C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson) in support of this require-
ment, in which La Forest J. wrote: “The ‘open courts’ principle is 
‘inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b)’ because it ‘permits 
the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court 
practices and proceedings’.”52  
What the Court skated over, however, is the fact that La Forest J. was 
articulating the rationale for the open court principle and not a require-
ment for its application. That is, the rule that the courts must be presump-
tively open exists because, as a general matter, it is important for 
individuals to be informed about the courts’ practices in order to engage 
in a meaningful debate about the courts. But it is not necessary for 
individuals to demonstrate on a case-by-case basis that they need access 
to the courts in order to engage in meaningful debate on a given subject 
before they are permitted to do so.  
The biggest problem with such a requirement is that it is easily ma-
nipulable. The entire analysis depends on the level of generality with 
                                                                                                             
51  See Ryder L. Gilliland, “Supreme Court Recognizes (a Derivative) Right to Access In-
formation” in Cameron & Ryder, id., 233, and Daniel Guttman, “Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. 
Ontario: A Limited Right to Government Information under Section 2(b) of the Charter” in Cameron 
& Ryder, id., 199, for some analysis in this regard. 
52  Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., supra, note 3, at para. 36. 
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which one defines the subject matter to be debated. For instance, in 
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., the Court held that it was not necessary for the 
Criminal Lawyers’ Association to have access to the OPP’s investigatory 
report to debate “the handling of the investigation into the murder of 
Domenic Racco” since it already had the access to the court record upon 
which the trial judge made his findings of misconduct in the stay applica-
tion.53 If, however, the Court had defined the subject matter to be debated 
as “the reasons why no state officials were held personally accountable 
for the mishandling of the investigation into the murder of Domenic 
Racco”, then surely access to the OPP’s investigatory report would have 
been necessary for a meaningful discussion to have occurred, especially 
given the OPP’s complete lack of an explanation in its press release for 
its refusal to lay charges.54 Indeed, this latter characterization is arguably 
more consistent with the intent of the Criminal Lawyers’ Association in 
bringing its request for disclosure in the first place.55 
More significantly for the purposes of this paper, there appears to be 
no principled basis for distinguishing between “access to court” cases 
and “access to government information” cases with respect to the 
“necessity for meaningful public commentary” criterion. The distinction 
between the two categories of institutions — namely, the transparency 
with which they have traditionally operated and the harmony between 
such transparency and their function — is already reflected in the second 
stage of the adapted Montréal (City) test, which looks at the nature of the 
institution about which the information is sought. There is no apparent 
additional distinction between the two categories of institutions that 
would justify imposing the “necessity for meaningful commentary” 
requirement for access to one and not for access to the other.  
Therefore, the Court’s judgment in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. repre-
sents a significant retreat from the propositions underlying the incorpora-
tion of the open court principle into section 2(b) of the Charter. The 
Court was not only unwilling to extend the same level of presumptive 
openness that it had granted to the courts under section 2(b) to other 
public or government institutions, but also felt compelled to impose an 
additional barrier to section 2(b) in the case of the latter. This additional 
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requirement cannot be easily explained by reference to any unique 
qualities possessed by the courts in contrast to other public institutions or 
vice versa.  
In principle, therefore, Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. also raised the pros-
pect of a significant curtailment of the open court principle. Was the 
Court now saying that a Charter claimant who seeks access to informa-
tion has to show that the information is necessary for a meaningful 
debate, even where the information pertains strictly to the courts? If not 
— that is, if the courts are truly sui generis — is that true of the court-
house as a whole or simply the courtroom and the documents filed 
therein? These questions would be answered seven months later in 
C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.). 
IV.  C.B.C. V. CANADA (A.G.) — SUI GENERIS  
NATURE OF THE COURTS 
In January 2011, the Supreme Court released a pair of judgments on 
the open court principle as applied in two different scenarios. First, in 
C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.),56 the Court examined the constitutionality of 
court rules restricting the areas of the courthouse in which the press are 
allowed to conduct interviews and use cameras and prohibiting the 
broadcasting of any recordings of court hearings. Second, in Société 
Radio-Canada v. Canada,57 the Court considered the issue of the proper 
test to be applied to a determination of whether to grant the public access 
to a videotaped witness statement that was filed as an exhibit at trial. The 
latter judgment did not break any new section 2(b) ground as the Court 
simply applied the well-established jurisprudence on public access to 
documentary court exhibits, which holds that the Dagenais/Mentuck test 
is applicable.58 Accordingly, the discussion to follow will focus exclu-
sively on C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.). 
In C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.), the C.B.C. challenged the constitutional-
ity of Rules 38.1 and 38.2 in the Rules of Practice of the Superior Court 
of the Province of Québec, Criminal Division, 2002,59 which provide: 
                                                                                                             
56  Supra, note 4. 
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58  Id., at paras. 8, 12, 13. 
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38.1 In order to ensure the fair administration of justice, the serenity 
of judicial hearings and the respect of the rights of litigants and 
witnesses, interviews and the use of cameras in a courthouse shall only 
be permitted in the areas designated for such purposes by directives of 
the chief justice. 
38.2 Any broadcasting of a recording of a hearing is prohibited.60 
Rule 38.1 is more interesting for the purposes of this paper as it aims 
to proscribe a particular means of gathering news and information, 
whereas Rule 38.2 is targeted more directly at an act of expression. The 
Court’s inquiry into the constitutionality of Rule 38.1 is more telling of 
the precise boundaries of section 2(b).  
The Court conducted its analysis in this regard by applying the three-
part Montréal (City) test that it had just refined months earlier in Crimi-
nal Lawyers’ Assn.: (1) Does the activity in question have expressive 
content, thereby bringing it, prima facie, within the scope of section 2(b) 
protection? (2) Is the activity excluded from that protection as a result of 
either the location or the method of expression? (3) If the activity is 
protected, does an infringement of the protected right result from either 
the purpose or the effect of the government action?61  
Interestingly, Deschamps J. (writing for a unanimous Court), quickly 
skipped over the first stage of this test without any discussion of the 
“necessity for meaningful commentary” criterion that the Court had 
innovated in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. Justice Deschamps dealt with this 
first stage summarily by observing that “[b]oth the Superior Court and 
the Court of Appeal concluded that filming, taking photographs and 
conducting interviews outside courtrooms are activities that have the 
necessary expressive content,” and “[t]he respondents do not dispute this 
conclusion, with which I agree.”62  
All of the section 2(b) action took place at the second stage of the 
Montréal (City) test. Justice Deschamps noted that the method for 
engaging in the expressive activities — the use of equipment to film, 
take photographs and record voices — was not the issue as this method 
of expression had been authorized by the court rules for a long time and 
continued to be expressly authorized in designated areas. Rather, the 
issue was whether the protection of section 2(b) attached to the location 
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of the expressive activities which was the subject of the impugned rule 
— namely, the public areas of courthouses.63 
Justice Deschamps concluded that there is nothing about the public 
areas of a courthouse that render the expressive activities conducted 
therein incompatible with the values protected by section 2(b). Rather, 
Deschamps J. concluded that the presence of journalists in the public areas 
of a courthouse has not only been “historically … authorized” but is 
“essential” to the “public’s ability to understand our justice system”. 
Justice Deschamps observed that “for journalists, the public areas serve not 
only as spaces they pass through to enter courtrooms, but also as places 
where they can gather information that may enhance the public’s under-
standing of trials.”64 The purpose of Rule 38.1 is to limit the expressive 
activities at this location and, therefore, section 2(b) is engaged.65 
Thus, Deschamps judgment confirmed one important thing about 
section 2(b) of the Charter and, in doing so, alleviated some of the 
concerns that free speech advocates and the press may have had after the 
release of Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.: the open court principle remains 
unshaken and its scope — at least under section 2(b) — is as broad as 
ever. The hurdles that the Court had erected against the application of 
section 2(b) to claims of access to information about other public 
institutions would have no effect on claims of access to information 
about the courts. This is true not only of the courtroom, but of all public 
areas of the courthouse. The courts as a whole are sui generis. 
Justice Deschamps’ opinion, of course, is far from a resounding bat-
tle cry for openness as Deschamps J. upheld the constitutionality of Rule 
38.1 under section 1 of the Charter. But a substantive discussion of the 
Court’s recent section 1 analyses in open court principle cases will have 
to be left for another commentator and another day.66 For the purposes of 
this paper, it is sufficient to note that C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.) confirmed 
that the presumption of openness applied to the courts by section 2(b) of 
the Charter has not withered.  
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V. NATIONAL POST — FREEDOM OF THE PRESS TO  
GATHER INFORMATION 
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. and C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.) together estab-
lished that subject matter about which information is sought is relevant 
in determining what level of section 2(b) protection applies. But what 
about the means of obtaining such information? We will recall that in 
C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson), La Forest J. repeated what he had earlier said in 
a sole concurring opinion in Lessard — namely, that section 2(b) protects 
the freedom of the press to “gather news”.67 Fifteen years later, in 
National Post, the Court clarified that this does not entail the freedom to 
engage in any and all methods of newsgathering free from state interfer-
ence, or even a newsgathering method with as strong a track record as 
that of using confidential sources. 
National Post involved a direct clash between the state’s interest in 
investigating crime and the freedom of the press to gather news. A 
journalist employed by the National Post (“National Post”) named 
Andrew McIntosh had taken an interest in then Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien’s involvement with the Grand-Mère Golf Club located in Mr. 
Chrétien’s home riding of St-Maurice, Quebec. Based on information 
received from a confidential source, Mr. McIntosh reported in the 
National Post that Mr. Chrétien had called the president of the Business 
Development Bank of Canada (“BDBC”) and urged approval of a bank 
loan to the hotel located next to the Grand-Mère Golf Club.68 This story 
had become known in the media as “Shawinigate”. 
Subsequently, Mr. McIntosh received a sealed plain brown envelope 
containing a document that appeared to be a copy of the BDBC internal 
loan authorization for a $615,000 mortgage to the hotel, which listed an 
outstanding debt of $23,040 to Mr. Chrétien’s family investment com-
pany. Mr. McIntosh concluded that if the document were genuine, it 
would represent a major escalation in the Shawinigate story. Mr. 
McIntosh faxed copies of the document to the BDBC, the Prime Minis-
ter’s office and the Prime Minister’s lawyer in order to check its authen-
ticity. All three said that the document was a forgery. Because it was 
unable to confirm the document’s authenticity, the National Post hesi-
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tated to publish the allegations. Other news organizations, however, had 
also obtained the document (not through the National Post) and pub-
lished details about it. Eventually, the National Post picked up the story.69 
Sometime during the week after the receipt of the document, a per-
son known as X sought a meeting with Mr. McIntosh. At the meeting, X 
confirmed that it was he/she who had sent the envelope and asked that it 
be destroyed. X feared that the envelope might link him/her to the bank 
document now alleged to be a forgery. X explained that he/she had 
received the document in the mail and had passed it on to Mr. McIntosh 
in the belief that it was genuine. Mr. McIntosh told X that he could not 
destroy the document because that would be both improper and highly 
unethical given the serious allegation that it had been forged. However, 
Mr. McIntosh told X that so long as he believed the document had not 
been provided by X to deliberately mislead him, he would undertake to 
keep X’s identity confidential. Mr. McIntosh added that should irrefuta-
ble evidence to the contrary emerge, the agreement of confidentiality 
would become null and void. X agreed to these terms.70  
A police investigation was launched into the alleged forgery. The 
RCMP met with Mr. McIntosh, the editor-in-chief of the National Post 
and its legal counsel, and requested the production of the allegedly 
forged document. The National Post refused production and advised that 
the document and the envelope had been placed in a secure location not 
on National Post premises. Mr. McIntosh declined to identify the 
source.71 
This prompted the RCMP to apply for a search warrant and an assis-
tance order compelling the National Post to assist in locating the docu-
ment and the envelope, and to make them available to the RCMP. The 
application was based on the belief that the document and the envelope 
formed part of the actus reus of the offences in question and the RCMP 
indicated that it intended to submit the document and envelope for 
forensic testing to determine if they had “fingerprints and other identify-
ing markings [including saliva] which might assist in identifying the 
source of the document”. Justice Khawly of the Ontario Court of Justice 
issued the search warrant and assistance order without written reasons. 
Mr. McIntosh, the editor-in-chief and the National Post then applied to 
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quash the warrant and assistance order and the matter came before 
Benotto J. of the Superior Court of Justice.72  
Justice Benotto set aside the search warrant and assistance order on 
the basis of, among other things, the issuing judge’s failure to consider 
the section 2(b) interests at stake. Justice Benotto cited La Forest J.’s 
concurring opinion in Lessard for the proposition that section 2(b) 
encompasses the right of the media to “gather news and information 
without undue governmental interference”.73 She then reviewed the 
evidence on all of the major stories that had been broken by the media 
due to confidential sources (including Watergate, the Airbus scandal, and 
the fall of Nortel Networks)74 and concluded that “[t]o compel a journal-
ist to break a promise of confidentiality would do serious harm to the 
constitutionally entrenched right of the media to gather and disseminate 
information.”75 
Justice Benotto’s judgment was reversed by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in reasons jointly authored by Laskin and Simmons JJ.A. On the 
point of interest in this paper, the Court of Appeal held that while “the 
gathering and dissemination of news and information without undue state 
interference is an integral component of the respondents’ constitutional 
right of freedom of the press,” this does not mean that journalists have 
“an automatic right to protect the confidentiality of their sources”.76 
Thus, the Court held that section 2(b) was not directly engaged on the 
facts of the case. Rather, it was sufficient to incorporate Charter values 
into the four-step, common law Wigmore analysis in determining 
whether case-by-case privilege had been made out for the confidentiality 
of Mr. McIntosh’s source.77 
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In an opinion written by Binnie J., a majority of the Supreme Court 
essentially upheld the Court of Appeal’s analysis.78 Justice Binnie began 
his analysis by reviewing the Court’s prior decision in Lessard. Justice 
Binnie agreed that the freedom of the press to publish news under section 
2(b) “necessarily involves a freedom to gather news”.79 Justice Binnie 
then stated that the Court should recognize “the further step that an 
important element in the news gathering function (especially in the area 
of investigative journalism) is the ability of the media to make use of 
confidential sources”.80 Justice Binnie based this conclusion on the fact 
that: 
The appellants and their expert witnesses make a convincing case that 
unless the media can offer anonymity in situations where sources 
would otherwise dry-up, freedom of expression in debate on matters of 
public interest would be badly compromised. Important stories will be 
left untold, and the transparency and accountability of our public 
institutions will be lessened to the public detriment.81  
Justice Binnie’s reasons then took a surprising turn. After acknowl-
edging that special status should be assigned to the journalistic method of 
relying on confidential sources given its proven track record, Binnie J. 
refused to bring it fully under the section 2(b) umbrella; instead, he 
agreed with the Court of Appeal that its role should be limited to that of 
informing the traditional Wigmore analysis for determining whether 
case-by-case privilege has been made out at common law. That is, it is 
relevant to the development of the common law in accordance with 
Charter values, but nothing more. Strangely, Binnie J.’s primary reason 
for refusing direct section 2(b) protection is premised on the same 
homogeneous view of newsgathering techniques that he appeared to 
reject only paragraphs earlier: 
News gathering, while not specifically mentioned in the text of s. 2(b) 
is implicit in news publication, but there are many techniques of news 
gathering and it carries the argument too far, in my view, to suggest 
that each of those news gathering techniques (including reliance on 
secret sources) should itself be regarded as entrenched in the 
                                                                                                             
78  Interestingly, Abella J. was the sole dissenter in National Post, supra, note 5, as she was 
in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 15. Justice Abella appears to be the Court’s 
strongest advocate of freedom of the press at the moment. 
79  National Post, supra, note 5, at para. 33. 
80  Id., at para. 33. 
81  Id. 
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Constitution. Chequebook journalism is also a routine method of 
gathering the news, but few would suggest that this too should be 
constitutionalized. Journalists are quick to use long-range microphones, 
telephoto lenses or electronic means to hear and see what is intended to 
be kept private (as in the case of then Finance Minister Marc Lalonde 
whose budget had to be amended because a cameraman captured parts 
of what were intended to be secret budget documents on Mr. Lalonde’s 
desk). Such techniques may be important for journalists (who, unlike 
prosecutors, have to get along without the power of subpoena), but this 
is not to say that just because they are important that news gathering 
techniques as such are entrenched in the Constitution.82 
No jurist can make slippery slope arguments sound as compelling as 
Binnie J.83 The objection that can be set against this view, however, is 
that as Binnie J. himself noted earlier in his judgment, the evidence 
showed that the use of confidential sources has proven time and time 
again to be necessary to unearth important public controversies84 and that 
freedom of expression would be “badly compromised” unless the media 
can offer anonymity to its sources.85 Indeed, the evidence was that the 
following controversies were revealed only because of secret sources 
(often internal whistle-blowers): 
(1) The tainted tuna scandal that led to the resignation of the Minister of 
Fisheries in Canada. 
(2) The story that Airbus Industrie paid secret commissions in the sale 
of Airbus aircraft. 
(3) The book For Services Rendered, about the search for a suspected 
KGB mole in the RCMP Security Service, and CBC’s The Fifth Es-
tate program on that mole, code-named “Long Knife”. 
                                                                                                             
82  Id., at para. 38. 
83  See, for example, Binnie J.’s judgment in R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 
S.C.R. 579, at para. 54 (S.C.C.):  
There was some discussion at the bar that a privacy interest does not cease until garbage 
becomes “anonymous”, but as Conrad J.A. noted, much garbage never becomes anony-
mous, e.g. addressed envelopes, personal letters and so on. In this case, the garbage in-
cluded invoices for the purchase of chemicals used in the preparation of the drug Ecstasy. 
The idea that s. 8 protects an individual’s privacy in garbage until the last unpaid bill rots 
into dust, or the incriminating letters turn into muck and are no longer decipherable, is to 
my mind too extravagant to contemplate. It would require the entire municipal disposal 
system to be regarded as an extension, in terms of privacy, of the dwelling-house. 
84  National Post, supra, note 5, at para. 28. 
85  Id., at para. 33. 
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(4) Stories dealing with the City of Toronto’s health inspection system 
for restaurants. 
(5) A story describing the operation of an illegal slaughterhouse for 
restaurants. 
(6) Stories about the fall of Nortel Networks that contrasted optimistic 
public forecasts by Nortel executives with internal Nortel discus-
sions warning of a potential devastating market downturn. 
(7) A story about wrongdoing by members of the RCMP security 
service in early 1977, including a break-in to obtain documents from 
a left-wing news agency in Montreal, Agence Presse Libre du Qué-
bec, illegal wiretaps in Vancouver and pen-registers.86 
Moreover, there was precedent for the view that freedom of the press 
under section 2(b) of the Charter includes the freedom to rely on confi-
dential sources. Justice La Forest emphasized the importance of this 
method of newsgathering nearly 20 years earlier in his concurring 
opinion in Lessard (which opinion he later cited approvingly on behalf of 
the unanimous Court in C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson)):87 
Like Cory J., I take it as a given that freedom of the press and other 
media is vital to a free society. There can be no doubt, of course, that it 
comprises the right to disseminate news, information and beliefs. This 
was the manner in which the right was originally expressed, in the first 
draft of s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms before 
its expansion to its present form. However, the freedom to disseminate 
information would be of little value if the freedom under s. 2(b) did not 
also encompass the right to gather news and other information without 
undue governmental interference. 
I have little doubt, too, that the gathering of information could in 
many circumstances be seriously inhibited if government had too ready 
access to information in the hands of the media. That someone might be 
deterred from providing information to a journalist because his or her 
identity could be revealed seems to me to be self-evident. As Stewart J. 
(dissenting) stated in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), 
at p. 572:  
It requires no blind leap of faith to understand that a person 
who gives information to a journalist only on condition that 
his identity will not be revealed will be less likely to give that 
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information if he knows that, despite the journalist’s 
assurance, his identity may in fact be disclosed.88 
Given these judicial pronouncements and the impressive evidence in 
the record about the utility (and often necessity) of relying on confiden-
tial sources to further the democratic discourse, it would not have been a 
huge leap for the Court to have brought journalist-source confidentiality 
within the direct protection of freedom of the press under section 2(b) of 
the Charter. The Court’s refusal to do so begs the question of what 
newsgathering techniques, if any, are protected directly by section 2(b) 
other than the mere right of access (e.g., sitting in a courtroom, request-
ing copies of court documents, and setting up cameras in the courthouse 
halls). If nothing else is protected, then the constitutional right of the 
press to “gather news” as originally articulated by La Forest J. in Lessard 
and then in C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson) will be nothing more than a euphe-
mism for the right of access. As illustrated by C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.) 
and Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., respectively, such a right may be easy to 
make out when access is sought to information about the courts; but it 
will be significantly more challenging when access is sought to informa-
tion about any other public or government institution.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The incorporation of the open court principle into section 2(b) of the 
Charter was once a cause for celebration for free speech advocates and 
the press. Not only did it constitutionalize the openness of the courts and 
their processes, but it also held out great promise for section 2(b) more 
generally. One can read Cory J.’s opinion in Edmonton Journal and 
envision a robust constitutional right that would act as the primary 
guarantor of transparent government in our democracy. Not only would it 
protect acts of expression, but also those acts necessary to make expres-
sion meaningful — such as the right to access information about gov-
ernment institutions, and the right of the press to gather news uninhibited 
                                                                                                             
88  Lessard, supra, note 33, at paras. 2-3, per La Forest J. In Lessard, La Forest J. cited and 
relied on Stewart J.’s dissenting opinion in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed searches of media premises. Justice Stewart had also dissented in 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with the exact 
issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in National Post. Instead of citing and relying on Stewart 
J.’s dissent, however, Binnie J. drew support from the majority’s opinion denying First Amendment 
protection to the confidentiality of journalist sources: see National Post, supra, note 5, at para. 47.  
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by state interference. It was the perfect example of a bold, purposive 
interpretation of the Charter. 
But the Supreme Court of Canada never allowed this conception of 
section 2(b) to fully break out of the gates (or courtroom doors). While it 
justified the open court principle on the basis that the public needs access 
to information about the courts in order to properly express themselves 
about the courts’ operations, it refused to extend the same logic to all 
government or public institutions. Rather, it has now held that a Charter 
claimant seeking access to non-judicial government information under 
section 2(b) must show, inter alia, that such information is “necessary for 
meaningful commentary”. Only then will he or she be granted the right 
of access. Moreover, the Court refused to extend section 2(b) protection 
to journalist-source confidentiality and, in doing so, effectively suggested 
that the right of access might be all there is to the right of the press to 
“gather news”. Despite La Forest J.’s earlier comments in Lessard to the 
contrary, the Court held that the freedom of the press to “gather news” 
does not entail Charter protection for one of the most effective and 
proven journalistic methods — reliance on confidential sources.  
The only success story for transparency in the trilogy of cases to 
consider the limits of section 2(b) in 2010-2011 — and it is a mild one — 
is C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.). In that case, the Court found that the limits on 
the press’ ability to gather in the public areas of the courthouse infringed 
section 2(b) (although the Court went on to uphold those limits under 
section 1). The factual basis of this case returned the Court to familiar 
territory: the courthouse. It was only in this context that the Court 
revisited some of the rhetoric of its earlier decisions in Edmonton 
Journal and C.B.C. (Re R. v. Carson).89 Within the courthouse, the value 
of transparency still retains its primacy in the section 2(b) analysis. The 
same is not true once one leaves the courthouse doors.  
Accordingly, Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., C.B.C. v. Canada (A.G.), and 
National Post signal a move away from the bold, purposive interpreta-
tion of section 2(b) adopted by the Court in the Charter’s earlier years. 
Rather than take the underlying propositions of the open court principle 
under section 2(b) to their logical end, the Court imposed additional 
restrictions to the operation of section 2(b) in non-judicial contexts. In 
doing so, the Court dashed the hopes of those who once envisioned 
section 2(b) as the primary guarantor of transparency in Canadian 
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democracy. For the time being, at least, the goal of transparency will 
have to be achieved largely through other means.  
